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Many of the theoretical innovations in linguistic theory and cognitive science due 
to Noam Chomsky, and now considered to be cornerstones of the biolinguistic/I-
language approach, are often viewed as radical replacements of earlier views in 
structural linguistics and psychology. In particular, the story often goes that 
Chomsky abandoned the structuralist tradition, along with “discovery proce-
dures” and distributional analyses as a means toward understanding linguistic 
structure, in his development of transformational generative grammar. The posi-
tion is also assigned to Chomsky that the study of language should consist of the 
elucidation of the innate component of the human mind and brain that allows for 
the acquisition of the rule systems of natural language and the real-time parsing 
of linguistic data. Both of these supposed truisms, however, require a serious 
reevaluation if the foundations of biolinguistics are to guide future research in 
the proper direction. Any divergences of generative grammar in linguistic theory 
and of universal grammar (UG) in cognitive science from previous conceptions of 
language and the mind have been too exaggerated. A careful consideration of the 
history and subsequent development of generative grammar and the biolingu-
istic/I-language approach will show, first, that distributional analyses were 
never abandoned in Chomsky’s program and, second, that external linguistic 
data are integral to a theory of UG. These clarifications are absolutely essential if 
one is to make progress in biolinguistics.  
 Transformational generative grammar, as outlined in Chomsky (1957), 
detailed in Chomsky (1955, 1975a), and modified and refined several times 
throughout the second half of the last century (Chomsky 1965, 1972, 1975b, 1981, 
1995) constituted a major departure from the structuralist tradition in linguistics. 
The aim of linguistic analysis from the structuralist, or distributionalist pers-
pective, as exemplified in the work of Leonard Bloomfield (1933), Zellig Harris 
(1951), and others is to extract structure and constraints on linguistic represen-
tation from the distribution of formal objects such as phonemes. That is, the focus 
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should be on the likelihood of occurrence of a particular object given the 
occurrence of another object, with the aim of constructing hypotheses about the 
higher-level structure of language (Huck & Goldsmith 1986). 
 With the risk of oversimplifying, one may conceive of the distributional 
program as a bottom-up approach, akin to exploratory data analysis and 
clustering, in which the inference of structure comes from the distributional 
relations of primitive elements in a corpus, while Chomsky’s transformational 
generative grammar, in contrast, takes a top-down approach, in which 
hypotheses about structure come from systems that generate a corpus. Working 
through many sentential examples, Chomsky became unconvinced that a distri-
butional program could accomplish the task of inferring higher-level structure 
from the relations between elements. Chomsky’s solution was a transformational 
generative grammar that could in principle generate the discrete infinity of gram-
matical expressions in a natural language. Furthermore, the ‘transformational’ 
component of this generative grammar differed markedly from the distributional 
program in positing different levels of representation connected by transfor-
mational rules. One level, deep structure in Chomsky’s earliest Standard Theory 
(Chomsky 1957) and logical form in his most recent Minimalist Program (Choms-
ky 1995), maps syntactic structure to semantic interpretation and transformation 
rules use this level as input to yield an output of another level of representation, 
surface structure (Chomsky 1957) or phonetic form (Chomsky 1995). 
 In considering the birth of generative grammar and its subsequent develop-
ment, one must be careful to consider the elements of earlier linguistic analysis 
that have been retained. Chomsky’s generative approach was never completely 
divorced from distributionalism. Chomsky realized that purely distributional 
procedures could not, as an empirical matter, yield higher-level language 
structures from a corpus, which was the initial impetus for his construction of a 
top-down, meta-theory of language (Chomsky 1951). He did not, however, reject 
the distributional program altogether as a necessary component of the theory of 
grammar. In the years prior to the publication of Chomsky (1957), the new field 
of information theory introduced a principled, mathematical description of 
coding and transmission over a noisy channel (Shannon 1948), which, for 
Chomsky (1955, 1975a) and later for Harris (1991), seemed to bear on linguistic 
analysis. Shannon (1951) showed that information theory provided a way to 
predict letters in a text given the previous letters. Considering information-
theoretic analysis as an empirical approach to the study of language structure, 
Chomsky notably worked with information theory pioneer Peter Elias to develop 
clustering algorithms for syntactic category formation and included the results of 
this analysis and a discussion of the scope and limits of distributional procedures 
in Chomsky (1955, 1975a: chap. V in particular). While Chomsky (1955, 1975a) is 
primarily an argument for a generative theory of language, there are several in-
stances in which it is clear that a wholesale rejection of distributional, bottom-up 
methods in linguistic analysis is not the correct position to take, and in fact that a 
distributional approach might be indispensable for syntactic category formation: 
 
Note that there is no question being raised here as to the legitimacy of the 
probabilistic approach, just as the legitimacy of the study of meaning was in 
no way brought into question when we pointed out […] that projection can-
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not be defined in semantic terms. Whether or not the statistical study of 
language can contribute to grammar, it surely can be justified on quite inde-
pendent grounds. These three approaches to language (grammatical, seman-
tic, statistical) are independently important. In particular, none of them re-
quires for its justification that it lead to solutions for problems which arise 
from pursuing one of the other approaches.     (Chomsky 1975a: 148, fn. 19) 
 
 Thus, one would be too swift to regard Chomsky’s approach as a successor 
to an extinct distributional program. Whether by lack of careful consideration of 
the foundations of generative theory or by trying to fit generative theory into 
some kind of Kuhnian paradigm shift, it is too often considered a truism that 
discovery procedures implemented to build categories and structures from pri-
mitive elements in linguistic data differ irrevocably from Chomsky’s linguistics 
(Searle 1972). For one, the distributionalist program has been used to great effect 
by computational and corpus linguists for parsing, machine translation, and 
other tasks ‘outside’ of the biolinguistic/I-language approach. Harris’s early 
hypothesis that morpheme boundaries corresponded to measurable variations in 
the complexity of phoneme sequences (Harris 1955) can be tested on a corpus of 
utterances (e.g., Hayes & Clark 1970, Tanaka-Ishii & Jin 2006), with the prediction 
that local phonemic entropy maxima will occur at morpheme boundaries. Yet, 
the most important point is that the distributional approach is not irrelevant to I-
language, in which it is often assumed that the only relevant theory for language 
structure is generative and syntacto-centric (Jackendoff 1998). While distribution-
alist methods might fail at inducing syntactic structure, they are useful, and no 
doubt essential, to the segmentation problem (i.e. the determination of syntactic 
categories from linguistic data). 
 As a case in point, the famous example sentence in Chomsky (1955, 1957, 
1975a), Colorless green ideas sleep furiously, is often touted as emblematic of the 
failure of distributional methods to induce structure from linguistic data. To a 
certain extent, this is true; the probability that each word in this sentence follows 
the other is thought to be vanishingly small, such that a parser would classify 
such a sentence as ungrammatical. Nevertheless, while the probability of the sen-
tence occurring as written might be the same as that of the ‘word salad’ one 
obtains in reading it backwards, the sentence is pronounced with normal 
intonation and judged as grammatical by virtue of being in the class of sentences 
of the form Adjective–Adjective–Noun–Verb–Adverb (Chomsky 1975a: 145–147). 
A generative theory of language would require the segmentation of linguistic 
data into higher-level categories that serve as elements of the syntactic structure. 
That certain, modern distributional methods lead to a high probability of occur-
rence of Colorless green ideas sleep furiously compared to the reverse string (e.g., 
Pereira 2000) is actually consistent with the research program discussed in 
Chomsky (1955, 1975a); while distributional methods are not sufficient to induce 
syntactic structure, they are indispensable for the delineation of syntactic cate-
gories in linguistic data. 
 The birth of transformational generative grammar was intimately tied to 
the so-called cognitive revolution that rejected behaviorism (Chomsky 1959) and 
emphasized the role of innate cognitive architecture in producing behaviors. The 
position of nativism is often associated with the logical problem of language 
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acquisition and the argument from the poverty of the stimulus: How does the 
child learn the grammar of its native language from degenerate and limited 
linguistic data without a pre-existing structure specialized for the task? The 
guiding principle for understanding this structure is the notion of UG, a theory of 
the biologically instantiated ability to acquire and utilize the rule systems of a 
natural language (Chomsky 1965, 2006). 
 Given that linguistic structures exhibit a complexity not observed in any 
non-human communication system, or in any other behavior for that matter, it is 
almost obligatory to infer that there is an aspect of human biology and cognition, 
not shared with any non-human, responsible for the potential for acquisition of 
these structures and their use in cognition and communication. UG is a system 
that describes this unique ability. What kind of ‘system’ is UG posited to be? In 
the biolinguistic/I-language approach, UG is not a set of linguistic principles 
external to the individual like the grammars of specific natural languages, but an 
internal system for acquiring any natural language. In another sense, UG can be 
considered the initial state of the language faculty before any language-specific 
input. Thus, the focus of the biolinguistic/I-language approach is on ‘human 
language’ as opposed to the study of specific natural languages and associated 
corpora (i.e. E-language). This point is central to the later Principles–and–Para-
meters (P&P) approach to language acquisition (Chomsky & Lasnik 1993). The 
P&P approach holds that the individual has instantiated knowledge (though of 
course not ‘conscious’ knowledge) of fundamental principles of linguistic oper-
ation that are necessary components of all natural languages and that natural 
languages manifest their differences by setting parameters in the existing UG (i.e. 
the initial state of the language faculty). 
 Unfortunately, as in the perceived distributional/generative divergence in 
the analysis of linguistic structures, a similar artificial rift is drawn between UG 
and statistical learning, the build-up of language structure from the statistical 
properties of a sound signal (Seidenberg et al. 2002). In fact, these perceived 
divergences are both undoubtedly derived from the urge to fit differing con-
ceptions of language analysis and language acquisition into an internalist–
externalist, or even nature–nurture, debate. As before, a careful consideration of 
the specific claims immanent in the biolinguistic/I-language approach will reveal 
the exaggeration that statistical learning is somehow an alternative account of 
language acquisition that is in conflict with UG. 
 To reiterate, UG is a theory of the initial state of the language faculty, 
which, in the P&P model, undergoes a setting of parameters driven by external 
linguistic data. This is a selectionist account of learning that, while a relatively 
recent viewpoint in cognitive science, has been prevalent in the study of the de-
velopment of biological structures (Piattelli-Palmarini 1989). There is noticeable 
confusion in the literature, and thus often artificial criticisms, about the claims of 
UG and the biolinguistic/I-language approach. For one, UG does not entail the 
‘unlearnability’ of language, at least not in the selectionist sense, as has unfortu-
nately been the position assigned to it in the literature (e.g., Bates & Elman 1996, 
Seidenberg 1997). UG is surely based upon the argument from the poverty of the 
stimulus, appealing to an innate structure to compensate for the lack of evidence 
needed to acquire the rule systems of natural language, but this does not relegate 
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the stimulus to negligible status. While children are theorized to be born with a 
UG, linguistic stimuli must allow the UG to converge on the correct grammar. 
  Many arguments countering, or purporting to counter, Chomsky’s notion 
of UG and the biolinguistic/I-language approach rely on the efficacy of statistical 
learning in segmentation of the sound signal in early cognitive development. The 
landmark study, most often cited in statistical theories of language acquisition, 
demonstrating the power of statistical learning in the segmentation problem is 
that of Saffran et al. (1996). In this study, the authors show that infants can learn 
the ‘words’ of an artificial grammar within only minutes of exposure to sound 
samples of this grammar. They hypothesize that word segmentation is computed 
from local minima in transitional probabilities (TP) between syllables, where 
TP(A→B) = P(AB)/P(A) with P(AB) the probability of syllable B following A and 
P(A) the total frequency (i.e. probability) of A in the corpus (Yang 2004). While 
the data from Saffran et al. (1996) and others establish the dexterity with which 
children and adults detect the statistical distribution of sounds, it is far from 
straightforward what this implies about the innate capacity to learn language, let 
alone that a system like UG may not be necessary, which some authors have 
suggested (Seidenberg 1997, Bates & Elman 1996). In fact, it appears more likely 
that statistical learning does not play a role in deriving structure, but rather pro-
vides the language learner with a way to establish appropriate segmentations of 
the auditory signal, and thus the correct representation of linguistic elements, yet 
without the assignment of structure (Peña et al. 2002, Endress et al. 2005). The 
relation of these arguments to those asserting the divergence between the gener-
ative and distributional approaches to language analysis is evident (Gleitman 
2002, in fact, argues that distributional approaches, while having little to do with 
cognitive science traditionally, have nonetheless been coapted to the field of 
language acquisition), and in both cases the same mistake is made; in the genera-
tive/distributional case, it is maintained that transformational generative gram-
mar has no use for bottom-up procedures working on external data, while in the 
UG/statistical learning case, it is maintained that UG does not require any 
demarcation of the relational properties in the sound signal. 
 Statistical learning would, at first glance, appear to refute the need for a 
system like UG and validate a general-purpose learning scheme. The fact is, 
however, that there are an infinite number of statistical items in a sound signal of 
which the learner can keep track. The learner must be able to attend to the 
significant statistical correlations, such as transitional probabilities, and not, for 
instance, the probability of one syllable rhyming with the next or the probability 
that two adjacent vowels are both nasal (Yang 2004). This requires that the learn-
er be equipped with some structure prior to linguistic exposure that accounts for 
the bias toward certain aspects of auditory stimuli and the neglect of other 
aspects. In effect, most arguments against the existence of a system like UG impli-
citly assume some initial structure that facilitates or constrains statistical learning. 
The appropriate question is not whether UG or a system like it exists, but what 
are its properties such that the learner can attend to certain features of the sound 
signal and acquire a complex rule system. General statistical learning schemes 
are not alone sufficient to account for the acquisition of a grammar. There is a 
need for an internal structure to attend to certain features of auditory stimuli. 
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 Besides engaging in the segmentation problem, it might be that statistical 
learning can play a role in convergence to the correct grammar during language 
acquisition, though this has not yet been investigated experimentally like the 
segmentation problem (see Kuhl & Rivera-Gaxiola 2008 for a recent review of 
feasible experimental techniques in language acquisition). One issue in UG that 
must be addressed is that of parameter setting: What exactly does it mean for 
external linguistic data to ‘set’ a ‘parameter’? The answer might involve a proba-
bilistic component. In one learning scheme, UG represents the hypothesis space 
of grammars and parameter setting would involve the discarding of hypotheses 
that are inconsistent with external linguistic data. This notion is problematic, 
however, given the developmental data, which suggest that parameter setting is 
gradual and not punctuational (Bloom 1993) and that at any given time, the child 
has a representation of many possible grammars, not just one (Crain & Pietroski 
2001). A scheme consistent with these data would be for each grammar in the 
hypothesis space to have a probability that is either increased or decreased 
depending on consistency or inconsistency with the linguistic input (Yang 2004). 
This kind of probabilistic hypothesis testing has been proposed as a neural basis 
for certain decision tasks (Gold & Shadlen 2002). While this situation still in-
volves UG, statistical learning plays dual roles: segmentation of the sound signal 
and gradual convergence to the correct grammar. Again, to say that UG is incom-
patible with statistical learning is severely mistaken in the same way as the claim 
that transformational generative grammar is incompatible with the distributional 
approach and does not incorporate any of its methods. 
 It is important for the advancement of the biolinguistic/I-language 
approach not to overplay the supposed methodological and conceptual distance 
between distributionalism/statistical learning on the one hand and transform-
ational generative grammar/UG on the other. All of these approaches are neces-
sary for a full account of the structure of natural language and the development 
of grammar in the individual. Without distributional methods, for instance, an 
objective account of the notions of ‘word’ or ‘lexicon’, both essential to transform-
ational generative grammar (e.g., the Merge operation acting upon lexical items in 
the Minimalist Program of Chomsky 1995), would be severely lacking. On the 
cognitive-science side, while UG is viewed as a biologically instantiated template 
to which the grammar of a natural language must conform, the theory of UG and 
the P&P approach have very little to say about the mechanisms of this ‘confor-
ming’. As in the necessity of the distributional approach for inducing syntactic 
categories, statistical learning appears sufficient (necessary?) to segment the 
sound signal into primitive linguistic elements based upon the statistics inherent 
in the stimulus. The propensity to frame new ideas as revolutionary attacks 
against past research programs is strong, but must often be mitigated through a 
careful consideration of the claims inherent in these new ideas and the extent to 
which they build upon previous ones. With this prescription in hand, it should 
be clear that the transformational generative grammar/distributionalism and 
UG/statistical learning chasms are not as wide as they are purported to be. In 
fact, all of these concepts and methods are utilized to some extent in the modern 
biolinguistic/I-language approach to natural language structure and the 
development and use of the biological language faculty. 
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